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MIRANDA, DICKERSON, AND JEWISH LEGAL THEORY: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RULE IN A COMPARATIVE
ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
SAMUEL J. LEVINE*
This Essay briefly explores Dickerson v. United States,1 the important 2000 decision in which a divided United States Supreme Court
held that the standard established in Miranda v. Arizona2 continues to
govern the admissibility of confessions, notwithstanding a federal statute enacted subsequent to Miranda that provided an alternative standard.3 Rather than focusing on substantive issues of the Fifth
Amendment and self-incrimination,4 this Essay addresses broader theoretical implications of the approaches adopted by the majority and
dissenting opinions in Dickerson. The majority of the Court concluded
that Miranda set forth a “constitutional rule,” and therefore could not
be superseded by a legislative act of Congress.5 The dissent argued
that in establishing such a “rule,” which is prophylactic in nature and
subject to exceptions and modifications, the Court impermissibly took
on the role of a legislature rather than the role of interpreter of the
Constitution.6
Drawing a parallel to the interpretation of the Torah in Jewish
legal theory,7 this Essay proposes a comparative framework for analyzCopyright  2009 by Samuel J. Levine.
* Professor of Law, Pepperdine University. I thank Mark Graber and the Editors of
the Maryland Law Review for inviting me to participate in the 2009 Maryland Constitutional
Law Schmooze. I thank Fraida Liba, Yehudah, Aryeh, Rachel, and Shira for continued
encouragement.
1. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
2. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006) (establishing that the admissibility of a confession depends upon whether the confession was “voluntarily given”), invalidated by Dickerson v.
United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
4. For a substantive discussion of self-incrimination in Jewish law and American law,
see Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction to Self-Incrimination in Jewish Law, with Application to the
American Legal System: A Psychological and Philosophical Analysis, 28 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 257 (2006).
5. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 444.
6. Id. at 450–61 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
7. This framework relies, in part, on my previous work. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine,
Jewish Legal Theory and American Constitutional Theory: Some Comparisons and Contrasts, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 441 (1997) [hereinafter Levine, Jewish Legal Theory] (developing a conceptual framework by which to apply the notion of “rules and standards” in Jewish law to
address contemporary constitutional issues); Samuel J. Levine, Of Inkblots and Omnisignificance: Conceptualizing Secondary and Symbolic Functions of the Ninth Amendment, in a Compara-
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ing the division between the majority and dissent over the concept
and status of a “constitutional rule.” This Essay finds a similar debate
among medieval legal authorities over the status of a rule in the Jewish
legal system that appears to function in a manner ordinarily reserved
for legislation.8 Some authorities categorize the rule as rabbinic legislation, while others understand the rule as a biblical law with quasilegislative characteristics.9 Taking the conceptual comparison a step
further, this Essay considers ways in which Jewish legal theory might
elucidate the nature of the “constitutional rule” delineated in
Miranda.10
I.

MIRANDA, DICKERSON,

AND THE

“CONSTITUTIONAL RULE”

A. Miranda
In the landmark 1966 case, Miranda v. Arizona,11 the United
States Supreme Court considered the applicability of the Fifth
tive Hermeneutic Framework, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. (forthcoming) (looking to the case of the
“stubborn and rebellious son” in Deuteronomy 21:18–21, which prescribes a capital penalty
for an unlikely offense, as a means by which to understand the apparent superfluity of the
Ninth Amendment); Samuel J. Levine, Unenumerated Constitutional Rights and Unenumerated
Biblical Obligations: A Preliminary Study in Comparative Hermeneutics, 15 CONST. COMMENT. 511
(1998) (exploring a similarity in biblical and constitutional interpretation, through which
unenumerated rights and principles emerge by reference to enumerated rights and principles). This framework also builds upon the work of a number of legal scholars. See, e.g.,
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 4 (1983) (developing a normative conception of the legal world by reference to
biblical text); David R. Dow, Constitutional Midrash: The Rabbis’ Solution to Professor Bickel’s
Problem, 29 HOUS. L. REV. 543 (1992) (drawing parallels between biblical and constitutional
interpretation while highlighting common interpretive principles and the analogous roles
of judge and rabbi); Ronald R. Garet, Comparative Normative Hermeneutics: Scripture, Literature, Constitution, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 35 (1985) (discussing, at length, common hermeneutic
principles applied in biblical, literary, and legal scholarship); Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (analogizing the conflict between “textualists”
and “supplementers” in constitutional interpretation to the conflict between Protestant
and Catholic biblical interpretation); Gregory A. Kalscheur, Christian Scripture and American
Scripture: An Instructive Analogy?, 21 J.L. & RELIGION 101 (2005–2006) (reviewing JAROSLAV
PELIKAN, INTERPRETING THE BIBLE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2004)); Sanford Levinson, “The
Constitution” in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123 (identifying similarities between conflicts over constitutional interpretation and conflicts over scriptural interpretations between the Catholic and Protestant churches); Michael J. Perry, The Authority of Text,
Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional “Interpretation,” 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551,
557–64 (1985) (analogizing certain forms of constitutional interpretation to the interpretation of sacred texts by religious communities); see generally SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH (1988) (exploring the effects of sanctifying the Constitution by placing it at
the center of American political life).
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. See infra Part II.B.
10. See infra Part II.B–C.
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Amendment privilege against self-incrimination12 in the context of
custodial police interrogation. The Court declared unequivocally that
“there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.”13
Moreover, the Court emphasized that “without proper safeguards the
process of in-custody interrogation . . . contains inherently compelling
pressures which work to undermine the individual’s will to resist and
to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely.”14
The Court held that “[i]n order to combat these pressures and to permit a full opportunity to exercise the privilege against self-incrimination, the accused must be adequately and effectively apprised of his
rights and the exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”15
Strikingly, in contrast to the Court’s forceful affirmation of the
applicability of Fifth Amendment rights during police interrogation,
the Court was unwilling to conclude that “the Constitution necessarily
requires adherence to any particular solution” as a means of protecting those rights.16 In fact, the Court encouraged Congress and the
States to “exercise . . . their creative rule-making capacities” to formulate effective methods of protecting the rights of individuals interrogated by the police.17 The Court, however, prescribed its own set of
safeguards, thus establishing the procedures that would constitute the
Miranda warnings.18 Notably, notwithstanding the Court’s insistence
that the Constitution does not require a particular solution, the Court
stated that “unless we are shown other procedures which are at least as
effective in apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case
to be a witness against himself . . . .”).
13. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See id. at 479. The Court explained the following:
[An individual in police custody] must be warned prior to any questioning that he
has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he
cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning
if he so desires. . . . [U]nless and until such warnings and waiver [of those rights]
are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used against him.
Id.
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assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the [Miranda warnings] must be observed.”19
The majority opinion in Miranda faced considerable criticism on
a number of grounds, including the argument that the Court’s methodology was “not constitutional interpretation . . . but legislation from
the bench.”20 Even defenders of Miranda acknowledged that the
opinion “does not even look like an ordinary opinion,” but instead
“reads more like a legislative committee report with an accompanying
statute.”21 Among other unusual characteristics of the opinion, critics
of Miranda pointed to the apparently “prophylactic” nature of the Miranda requirements22 as more akin to legislation than judicial interpretation of the Constitution. Indeed, the language and logic
employed in a number of subsequent United States Supreme Court
decisions reinforce the impression that Miranda established “prophylactic standards” beyond the protections provided by the Constitution23 and thus “sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment
itself.”24 Likewise, the process through which the Court adopted various exceptions to Miranda arguably resembles legislative modification
rather than constitutional interpretation.25

19. Id. at 467.
20. Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Decision Rules, 90 VA. L. REV. 1, 19 & n.57 (2004)
(citing Justice Harlan’s Miranda dissent as well as a number of “especially prominent assaults” leveled on Miranda by legal scholars).
21. David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 190, 190
(1988); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Judicial Legitimacy and the Unwritten Constitution: A
Comment on Miranda and Dickerson, 45 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 122 (2000–2001) (“Even
on the surface, Miranda’s insistence on detailed warnings looks legislative.”).
22. See, e.g., Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article
III Legitimacy, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 100, 106–11 (1985) (explaining how the Miranda holding
is prophylactic).
23. E.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 445–46 (1974).
24. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985); see also Richard H.W. Maloy, Can a Rule
Be Prophylactic and Yet Constitutional?, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 2465, 2471–74 (2001) (noting that five members of the seven Justice majority in Dickerson had authored opinions
indicating that Miranda was not a “constitutional” decision).
25. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 455 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia explained the following:
[I]f confessions procured in violation of Miranda are confessions “compelled” in
violation of the Constitution, the post-Miranda decisions I have discussed [that
did not require suppression of such confessions] do not make sense. The only
reasoned basis for their outcome was that a violation of Miranda is not a violation
of the Constitution.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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In addition to the criticisms leveled against Miranda by Justices
and scholars alike, a federal statute26 enacted just two years after the
Miranda decision presented a more direct challenge by providing an
alternative standard for the admissibility of statements obtained
through custodial interrogation. In place of the Miranda requirements, the statute proposed that the admissibility of a confession
should turn on the issue of “voluntariness,” which is to be determined
through “consideration [of] all the circumstances surrounding the
giving of the confession.”27 On one level, the statute may simply have
represented Congress’s attempt to comply with the Court’s suggestion
that legislatures develop effective procedures to protect suspects’ Fifth
Amendment rights during police interrogation.28 More significantly,
however, the statutory response to Miranda would lead the Court to
carefully re-examine the precise nature of the Miranda requirements
and their relationship to the Constitution.29
B. Dickerson
In 2000, more than three decades after the enactment of the federal statute, the United States Supreme Court decided Dickerson v.
United States,30 thus finally addressing the competing standards for the
admissibility of custodial confessions. The majority opinion presented
the issue in stark and ostensibly clear terms. As a threshold matter,
notwithstanding the Court’s “supervisory authority . . . to prescribe
rules of evidence and procedure” in federal courts, “Congress retains
the ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created
rules of evidence and procedure that are not required by the Constitution.”31 At the same time, “Congress may not legislatively supersede
[the Court’s] decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution.”32
Therefore, the case turned on the basic question: “[W]hether the Miranda Court announced a constitutional rule or merely exercised its
supervisory authority to regulate evidence in the absence of congressional direction.”33
26. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2006) (establishing that a confession shall be admissible in
evidence if “voluntarily given”), invalidated by Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428
(2000).
27. Id.
28. See supra text accompanying note 17.
29. See infra Part I.B.
30. 530 U.S. 428 (2000).
31. Id. at 437.
32. Id.
33. Id.

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\69-1\MLR107.txt

2009]

MIRANDA, DICKERSON,

unknown

AND

Seq: 6

25-NOV-09

JEWISH LEGAL THEORY

9:13

83

As the Court acknowledged in Dickerson, however, the seemingly
straightforward articulation of this question belied the complex and
somewhat elusive nature of its answer. After all, in decisions subsequent to Miranda, the United States Supreme Court had carved out
“several exceptions” to Miranda’s requirements and had “repeatedly
referred to the Miranda warnings as ‘prophylactic’ and ‘not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.’”34 As the Court conceded, the language in some of these cases supported the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals in Dickerson that “the protections announced
in Miranda are not constitutionally required.”35
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court rejected this approach, instead
characterizing Miranda as a “constitutional decision.”36 The Court
emphasized that the Miranda opinion “is replete with statements indicating that the [Miranda] majority thought it was announcing a constitutional rule.”37 As for subsequent United States Supreme Court
decisions modifying the Miranda rule, the Court explained that
“[t]hese decisions illustrate the principle—not that Miranda is not a
constitutional rule—but that no constitutional rule is immutable.”38
In this light, “the sort of modifications represented by these cases are
as much a normal part of constitutional law as the original decision.”39
In a stinging dissent, Justice Scalia questioned the notion that Miranda set forth a “constitutional rule.” In a careful reading of the majority opinion, Justice Scalia observed that the Court limited its
depiction of Miranda to “‘a constitutional decision’” that is “‘constitutionally based’” and that has “‘constitutional underpinnings.’”40 Significantly, he noted, the Court did not directly state that “‘custodial
interrogation that is not preceded by Miranda warnings or their
equivalent violates the Constitution of the United States.’”41
In addition, Justice Scalia found the prophylactic qualities of Miranda and the later modifications of Miranda inconsistent with the notion that Miranda delineated constitutional protections.42 Instead, he
insisted, these cases demonstrate that “a violation of Miranda is not a
34. Id. at 437–38 (internal citations omitted); see id. at 438 n.2 (citing cases).
35. Id. at 438 (citing United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 687–90 (4th Cir. 1999),
rev’d, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 439.
38. Id. at 441.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 446 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting id. at 438, 440 & n.5 (majority opinion)).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 450–54.
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violation of the Constitution.”43 Quoting approvingly from a dissenting opinion in the 1969 case North Carolina v. Pearce,44 Justice Scalia
wrote that “Justice Black surely had the right idea when he derided
[the Pearce majority’s similarly prophylactic rule] as ‘pure legislation if
there ever was legislation.’”45 Justice Scalia took this critique even further in Dickerson, arguing that “Pearce’s ruling pales as a legislative
achievement when compared to the detailed code promulgated in Miranda.”46 In short, Justice Scalia rejected the majority’s conception of
Miranda as judicial interpretation of the Constitution.
Justice Scalia’s dissatisfaction with the majority opinion in Dickerson was shared by a wide range of scholars, including many who supported the outcome of the case.47 In turn, scholars have offered a
variety of responses to the Court’s ruling, providing both theories to
justify the majority’s decision and further grounds for criticism.48
The next section of this Essay aims to provide a conceptual framework for understanding the division between the majority and dissenting opinions in Dickerson. Turning to Jewish legal theory, this Essay
draws a parallel to a dispute in the Jewish legal system regarding the
status of laws that, similar to Miranda warnings, operate in a manner
that resembles legislation, but that, according to some authorities, are
derived through a form of judicial decisionmaking rather than a legislative process.
43. Id. at 455 (emphasis in original).
44. 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
45. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 460 (quoting Pearce, 395 U.S. at 741 (Black, J., dissenting)).
46. Id.
47. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 20, at 26 & n.94 (stating that “[u]nfortunately, the
majority did not engage Justice Scalia’s attack” and noting that “[t]his is a wholly unoriginal observation, one frequently expressed by those who applaud, as well as by those who
decry, the outcome in Dickerson” and citing sources); Evan H. Caminker, Miranda and Some
Puzzles of “Prophylactic” Rules, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001) (referring to Dickerson’s “lack of
intellectual coherence, or at least candor” and stating that in the majority opinion, Chief
Justice Rehnquist “certainly made little effort to square the decision with the Court’s (and
his) repeated disparagement of Miranda as articulating merely a prophylactic rule not required by the Fifth Amendment”); Fallon, supra note 21, at 126 (“Frustratingly, the Court
in Dickerson never faced up to the challenge posed by the dissent . . . .”).
Paul Cassell, whose scholarship and legal arguments were instrumental throughout
the course of the Dickerson litigation, recalled his immediate reaction to the decision:
“Where’s the rest of the opinion?” Paul G. Cassell, The Paths Not Taken: The Supreme Court’s
Failures in Dickerson, 99 MICH. L. REV. 898, 898 (2001).
48. See, e.g., Symposium, Miranda After Dickerson: The Future of Confession Law, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 879 (2001) (including eleven articles discussing the status of Miranda following the
Dickerson decision); Berman, supra note 20 (suggesting how the Dickerson majority could
have responded to the complex doctrine announced by the Miranda Court); Caminker,
supra note 47 (using both Miranda and Dickerson as a means of defending the legitimacy of
prophylactic doctrinal rules); Fallon, supra note 21 (arguing that the Dickerson opinion is a
legitimate one).
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II. THE JEWISH LEGAL MODEL
A. The Torah, Biblical Interpretation, and Rabbinic Legislation: A Brief
Introduction
In Jewish legal theory, the Torah, consisting of the Five Books of
Moses, serves as the foundational source of the legal system and carries the authority of supreme law.49 In the words of a leading contemporary scholar, the Torah is the “written ‘constitution’ of Jewish
law.”50 Somewhat parallel to principles of American constitutional
doctrine, biblical authority extends not only to laws that are delineated in the text of the Torah, but also to those derived from the text
through methods of interpretation.51 Laws that are based in the biblical text and its interpretation thus have the status of d’oraita, a Talmudic term drawing upon the Aramaic translation of “Torah.”52 An
additional category of laws, enacted by legal authorities through a legislative process, has the subordinate status of d’rabbanan, Aramaic for
“rabbinic.”53
A helpful illustration of the different legal categories may be
found in the Torah’s instruction not to engage in melacha on the Sabbath.54 Although melacha is sometimes translated as “work,” a more
accurate legal definition of this term denotes a variety of ritually prohibited activities.55 Specifically, while the text of the Torah enumerates but a few examples,56 through textual exegesis, the Talmud
delineates thirty-nine principal categories of melacha, which are in
turn divided into further sub-categories.57 Because these laws are derived through interpretation of the biblical text, these categories and
49. Samuel J. Levine, An Introduction to Legislation in Jewish Law, with References to the
American Legal System, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 916, 919 (1999) [hereinafter Levine, Introduction] (citing 2 MENACHAM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 479, 481 (Bernard Auerbach & Melvin J. Sikes trans., 1994)).
50. 2 MENACHEM ELON, JEWISH LAW: HISTORY, SOURCES, PRINCIPLES 479 (Bernard
Auerbach & Melvin J. Sykes trans., 1994).
51. E.g., Levine, Introduction, supra note 49, at 919 & n.19; Levine, Jewish Legal Theory,
supra note 7, at 445–46 & n.26.
52. Levine, Introduction, supra note 49, at 919.
53. Id. at 920.
54. See, e.g., Exodus 20:10; Exodus 35:2; Leviticus 23:3; Deuteronomy 5:14.
55. See, e.g., Levine, Introduction, supra note 49, at 922 & n.36 (explaining that melacha
or melakha denotes a broad range of activity categorized ritually as “work”) (citation omitted); Levine, Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 445–46, 456 (same); see also ARYEH KAPLAN,
Sabbath: Day of Eternity, in II THE ARYEH KAPLAN ANTHOLOGY 107, 128 (1998) (“[T]he prohibition is not against actual labor as much as against ritual work.”).
56. See Exodus 16:29 (“‘let no man leave his place’”); Exodus 35:3 (“kindle no fire”);
Numbers 15:32–36 (“gathering wood”).
57. See TALMUD BAVLI, Shabbath, passim. Most of the literature on Jewish law is written
in Hebrew. For helpful depictions of the categories of melacha that are written in English,

R
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sub-categories of melacha all have the status of d’oraita laws.58 To supplement the categories of biblically prohibited melacha, legal authorities enacted rabbinic legislation prohibiting various other activities as
well.59
The relative status of laws that are d’oraita and d’rabbanan, respectively, is expressed in functional differences premised largely on fundamental distinctions in the purpose of the laws.60 Under Jewish legal
theory, biblical laws are of Divine origin and command, and thus are
inherently justified as a manifestation of Divine will.61 Rabbinic legislation, in contrast, serves the express prophylactic purpose of safeguarding compliance with biblical laws.62 Accordingly, in the context
of melacha on the Sabbath, rabbinic legislation functions primarily as a
means of protecting against violations of biblically prohibited
activities.63
In addition to the laws of the Sabbath, the Torah also proscribes
melacha on a number of holidays that take place at various times
throughout the year.64 Although the range of activities prohibited on
these holidays is somewhat more limited and violations are not quite
as consequential,65 most of these laws are derived from the text and
interpretation of the Torah, and thus likewise have the status of
d’oraita.
see, for example, KAPLAN, supra note 55, at 133–44; BARUCH CHAIT, THE 39 AVOTH MELACHA OF SHABBATH (1992) (illustrated book with scholarly commentary).
58. See supra text accompanying note 52.
59. E.g., KAPLAN, supra note 55, at 132; Levine, Introduction, supra note 49, at 923.
60. See Levine, Introduction, supra note 49, at 927–31 (explaining limitations on rabbinic
legislative authority); see also CHAIT, supra note 57, at 13 (“Some of the differences between
a d’Oraysa and a d’Rabbanan prohibition are: 1. the type of punishment issued for the
transgression[;] 2. the requirements necessary which permit a Jew to ask a non-Jew to perform a Melacha. For example, a non-Jew may be requested to do a Melacha d’Rabbanan in
order to prevent a Jew from suffering a great financial loss or to enable a Jew to perform a
Mitzvah.”).
61. See Levine, Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 458–61 (describing the general rule
that rabbinical authorities may not place limitations upon the applicability of a commandment on the basis of the commandment’s ostensible rationale).
62. See Levine, Introduction, supra note 49, at 926 (“[T]he Talmud identifies a Biblical
source for the authority of negative rabbinic legislation, such as the protective measures
implemented to prevent violation of the Biblical laws of the Sabbath or Biblical prohibitions . . . .”). For a discussion of positive rabbinic legislation, which mandates rather than
prohibits certain activities, see id. at 920–21.
63. For a more detailed and nuanced discussion of different functions and sub-categories of rabbinic legislation related to the Sabbath, see id. at 922–25.
64. See, e.g., Leviticus 23:4–44 (listing sacred days on which work is prohibited); Numbers
28:16–31, 29:1–39 (same).
65. See generally TALMUD BAVLI, Beitza (delineating the contours of the prohibition of
melacha on holidays).
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B. Melacha on Chol Ha-Moed: A Comparative Conceptual
Framework
A more complex question surrounds the status of the prohibition
of melacha on chol ha-moed,66 the relatively less sacred days that comprise the intermediate portion of lengthier holiday periods.67 Noting
that melacha is permitted on chol ha-moed in a variety of circumstances,
including when necessary to prevent substantial monetary loss or in
deference to other needs of the day,68 a number of medieval legal
authorities argued that such exceptions to a legal rule are indications
of a legislative enactment rather than textual interpretation. Therefore, they concluded, unlike the laws of the Sabbath and other holidays, the prohibition of melacha on chol ha-moed has the status of
d’rabbanan law rather than d’oraita law.69 Moreover, based on a Talmudic statement that “they prohibited” melacha on chol ha-moed to encourage activities more consistent with the spirit of the holiday, such
as the study of the Torah,70 these authorities inferred that the prohibition was derived through prophylactic rabbinic legislation, to protect
the sanctity of the day, and not through biblical interpretation.71
This analysis seems to correlate with Justice Scalia’s arguments in
Dickerson. Justice Scalia similarly cited exceptions to Miranda requirements as indicating that Miranda operated as a form of legislation and
not as constitutional law.72 Likewise, as Justice Scalia emphasized and
as the majority in Dickerson conceded, several United States Supreme
66. Discussions of this issue, originating in the Talmud, have produced a substantial
body of literature. See, e.g., YOSEF BABAD, MINCHAS CHINUCH (commenting on SEFER HACHINUCH, Commandment 323) (author’s translation); ARYEH LOEB BEN ASHER, TUREI EVEN
(commenting on TALMUD BAVLI, Chagiga 18a) (author’s translation); JOSEPH B.
SOLOVEITCHIK, SHIUREI HA-GRI’D AL INYANEI TEFILLIN, KETIVAT STA’M V’TZIZIT 75–77
(Menachem Kahn ed., 2004) (author’s translation). For a brief discussion in English, see
DOVID ZUCKER & MOSHE FRANCIS, CHOL HAMOED 5–10 (1981).
67. See Leviticus 23:4–8, 33–38 (discussing the “Feast of Unleavened Bread” (Passover)
and the “Feast of Booths” (Sukkot)).
68. ZUCKER & FRANCIS, supra note 66, at 6.
69. See, e.g., TOSAFOTH (commenting on TALMUD BAVLI, Chagiga 18a) (author’s translation); RABBENU ASHER, Introduction to TALMUD BAVLI, Moed Katan (author’s translation).
70. TALMUD YERUSHALMI, Moed Katan 2:3.
71. See, e.g., TOSAFOTH (commenting on TALMUD BAVLI, Chagiga 18a) (author’s translation); RABBENU ASHER, Introduction to TALMUD BAVLI, Moed Katan (author’s translation).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46. It should be noted, however, that Justice
Scalia’s analysis was aimed at demonstrating that Miranda was an illegitimate exercise of
legislative authority by the Court, which, in the American legal system, is charged with
interpreting the law. In the Jewish legal system, the high court had the authority both to
interpret the biblical text and to legislate. See generally Levine, Introduction, supra note 49;
Levine, Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 7. Thus, the debate among medieval legal authorities revolved around which of these legitimate functions the rabbinic decisionmakers exercised in instituting the prohibition of melacha on chol ha-moed.
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Court decisions point to the prophylactic role that Miranda warnings
play in safeguarding a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.73 In Justice
Scalia’s view, references to the prophylactic purpose demonstrate that
Miranda embodied legislative decisionmaking rather than constitutional interpretation.74
In contrast to these approaches, however, other medieval legal
authorities adopted an alternative position regarding the status of the
prohibition of melacha on chol ha-moed.75 Citing the Talmud’s apparent reliance on methods of biblical exegesis to derive the prohibition
of melacha on chol ha-moed,76 these authorities concluded that the prohibition is based on the text of the Torah, and therefore has the status
of d’oraita law.77 As to characteristics of the prohibition that resemble
rabbinic legislation, including the broad range of exceptions to the
rule and the ostensibly prophylactic purpose of the law, they turned to
another Talmudic statement: “lo m’saran ha’katuv ella l’chachamim”—
the Torah granted to rabbinic decisionmakers the authority to determine the precise contours of the law.78 Thus, these commentators
explained, the prohibition of melacha on chol ha-moed represents an
instance in which a law has the status of d’oraita, but the details of the
law are subject to methods of decisionmaking more commonly associated with rabbinic legislation.
Perhaps a similar analytical framework would provide a response
to Justice Scalia’s objections in Dickerson. Under this framework, the
Miranda requirements are based on the Fifth Amendment, but they
are instituted through an unusual form of constitutional adjudication—a “constitutional rule”—which is derived through a process that
more closely resembles judicial legislation. Accordingly, the law includes exceptions and prophylactic purposes, which are qualities
more commonly reserved for legislative enactments.79
73. See supra text accompanying notes 34–35, 42–43.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
75. See RASHI (commenting on TALMUD BAVLI, Moed Katan 11b) (author’s translation);
RAMBAM, MISHNE TORAH, LAWS OF YOM TOV (7:1) (author’s translation).
76. See TALMUD BAVLI, Chagiga 18a (citing Scripture to support the prohibition of melacha on chol ha-moed).
77. Legal authorities advocating the opposing view understand this exegesis as a homiletic reading of the biblical text offered as a basis for rabbinic legislation, rather than as a
genuine instance of biblical interpretation. See, e.g., TOSAFOTH (commenting on TALMUD
BAVLI, Chagiga 18a) (author’s translation); RABBENU ASHER, Introduction to TALMUD BAVLI,
Moed Katan (author’s translation).
78. TALMUD BAVLI, Chagiga 18a; see also id. (commentary of Zevi Hirsch Chajes).
79. It should be noted that some leading scholars reject the notion that prophylactic
rules are either unusual or illegitimate in constitutional adjudication. See, e.g., Caminker,
supra note 47, at 25–28 (finding Miranda’s “prophylactic” rule to be indistinguishable from
“run-of-the-mill” judicial doctrine applied to First Amendment, equal protection, and in-
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C. Further Theoretical Applications to Miranda and Dickerson
In addition to providing a conceptual framework for responding
to Justice Scalia’s arguments, the analogue to the prohibition of melacha on chol ha-moed may help further elucidate the majority position
in Dickerson. Some scholars have employed a close reading of the biblical text to explain the view that the prohibition of melacha on chol hamoed is d’oraita law with legislative characteristics.80 Specifically, unlike
the biblical prohibitions on the Sabbath and other holidays, which are
stated expressly,81 the prohibition of melacha on chol ha-moed is drawn
from the Torah’s command that these days be observed as “holy.”82
Thus, under the terms of the biblical text, refraining from melacha on
chol ha-moed serves a primarily prophylactic function of safeguarding
the sanctity of chol ha-moed by distinguishing it from an ordinary weekday.83 Accordingly, in contrast to the contours of the prohibition of
melacha on the Sabbath and other holidays, which are derived through
standard forms of biblical interpretation, the precise details of the
prohibition on chol ha-moed are subject to quasi-legislative determinations of rabbinic decisionmakers aimed at promoting the purpose of
biblical law.84
A similar reasoning may shed light on the majority opinion in
Dickerson. The Fifth Amendment states the following: “No person
shall be . . . compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself . . . .”85 Although the constitutional text refers specifically to
testimonial settings, without mention of police interrogation, the Miranda opinion emphasized the Court’s understanding that Fifth
Amendment protections against compelled self-incrimination extend
beyond the courtroom.86 Accordingly, the majority in Dickerson may
have concluded that in place of standard methods of constitutional
analysis, the Miranda Court found it necessary to employ a prophylactic interpretive approach to protect against the compulsion inherent
in the interrogation process. In short, similar to the prohibition of
terstate commerce questions); Strauss, supra note 21, at 195–207 (arguing that prophylactic rules are not “of questionable legitimacy,” but rather “are a central and necessary
feature of constitutional law”). Likewise, some suggest that it may not be unusual for biblical laws to have prophylactic characteristics. See, e.g., YOSEF ENGEL, SEFER LEKACH TOV
167–80 (author’s translation).
80. See SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 66, at 75–76 (author’s translation).
81. See supra notes 54, 64 and accompanying text.
82. Leviticus 23:37. This reading of the biblical text represents one view in the Talmud.
See TALMUD BAVLI, Chagiga 18a (“‘Holy’ implies the prohibition of work.”).
83. See SOLOVEITCHIK, supra note 66, at 75–76 (author’s translation).
84. See id. (author’s translation).
85. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 13–15.
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melacha on chol ha-moed, Miranda warnings serve as a constitutionally
required rule that functions to safeguard Fifth Amendment rights.87
Therefore, the details of the rule are likewise established through
quasi-legislative determinations of the Court.
Finally, comparisons to the prohibition of melacha on chol ha-moed
may have procedural ramifications as well. Under Jewish legal theory,
in the realm of biblical interpretation, courts generally have the license to rule on the basis of their own interpretive reasoning, rather
than deferring to previous interpretations.88 When exercising their
legislative capacity, however, courts are far more limited in their authority to abrogate previous legislation.89 In the context of biblical
laws that are delineated through quasi-legislative rabbinic determinations, some scholars have suggested that the interpretive authority of
later courts would be subject to the more extensive constraints that
ordinarily govern legislative action.90
Applying these principles to Dickerson may offer support for the
majority’s adherence to the validity of Miranda. The majority declared
that, notwithstanding the merits of arguments questioning the Court’s
holding and reasoning in Miranda, “the principles of stare decisis weigh
heavily against overruling it.”91 In response, Justice Scalia quoted
from a United States Supreme Court case: “‘Where . . . changes have
removed or weakened the conceptual underpinnings from the prior
87. Cf. Berman, supra note 20, at 154 (distinguishing between “judge-interpreted constitutional meaning and constitutional decision rules” and conceptualizing Miranda as a
“constitutional decision rule . . . adopted to optimally enforce constitutional meaning,” and
therefore arguing that Miranda is not an instance of illegitimate prophylactic rule-making,
because “it does not overenforce constitutional meaning as measured against the appropriate
baseline”) (emphasis in original).
88. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 7, at 475–77; see also HERSHEL SCHACHTER,
GINAS EGOZ 157–58 (2007) [hereinafter SCHACHTER, GINAS EGOZ] (author’s translation);
YITZCHAK ZEEV HA-LEVI SOLOVEITCHIK, CHIDUSHEI MARAN RI’Z HA-LEVI AL HA-TORAH 116–17
(2003) (commenting on Ruth 4:6) (author’s translation). It should be noted, however,
that in the course of Jewish history, legal authorities have often found it necessary to defer
to the interpretations of earlier authorities. Levine, Jewish Legal Theory, supra note 7, at
476–77; see also HERSHEL SCHACHTER, B’IKVEI HA-TZON 243–44 (1997) [hereinafter
SCHACHTER, B’IKVEI HA-TZON] (author’s translation); JOSEPH B. SOLOVEITCHIK, SHIURIM
L’ZECHER ABBA MARI Z’L 241–61 (2002) [hereinafter SOLOVEITCHIK, SHIURIM L’ZECHER
ABBA MARI Z’L] (author’s translation); ELCHANAN WASSERMAN, KOBETZ HE’AROS 115 (Elazar
Wasserman ed., 2003) (author’s translation).
89. See Levine, Introduction, supra note 49, at 932–34 (describing briefly the complex
rules restricting the power of a later court to modify earlier rabbinic legislation); see also
SCHACHTER, B’IKVEI HA-TZON, supra note 88, at 243–44 (author’s translation);
SOLOVEITCHIK, SHIURIM L’ZECHER ABBA MARI Z’L, supra note 88, at 241–61 (author’s
translation).
90. See SCHACHTER, GINAS EGOZ, supra note 88, at 7 (author’s translation).
91. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
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decision, . . . or where the later law has rendered the decision irreconcilable with competing legal doctrines or policies, . . . the Court has
not hesitated to overrule an earlier decision.’”92 As per Justice Scalia’s
analysis, to the extent that it represented constitutional adjudication,
Miranda’s reasoning was no longer viable. Thus, he argued, stare decisis should not preclude overruling Miranda through the standard process of constitutional interpretation.93
Perhaps the majority’s abiding reliance on stare decisis to uphold
Miranda can be premised on an alternative conception of Miranda as
an instance of the United States Supreme Court’s quasi-legislative constitutional decisionmaking. In this perspective, parallel to the status
of biblical laws derived by courts through quasi-legislation—and contrary to Justice Scalia’s analysis—Miranda warnings represent a constitutional law that is not susceptible to abrogation through the ordinary
process of constitutional interpretation. Instead, the United States Supreme Court would be more limited in its authority to overrule Miranda, perhaps requiring a more formal quasi-legislative decision
expressly overturning its earlier holding.94 Accordingly, the majority
in Dickerson may have concluded that, short of such a decision by the
Court, Miranda stands as a constitutional rule.

92. Id. at 462–63 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989)). Moreover, he added, this quotation referred to overruling “statutory cases,” while “the standard for constitutional decisions is somewhat more lenient.”
Id. at 462.
93. For an elaboration on Justice Scalia’s argument in this regard, see Berman, supra
note 20, at 27–28 n.101.
94. Cf. id. at 28 n.101 (“[E]ven were the majority to concede that Miranda is most fairly
read as conceiving of itself as engaged in constitutional interpretation, it is not at all obvious why it should not frankly construe Miranda as announcing a prophylactic rule and then
afford it stare decisis deference on that rationale.”) (emphasis in original).
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